A Conceptual Framework for Investigating Organizational Control and Resistance in Crowd-Based Platforms by Askay, David
A Conceptual Framework for Investigating Organizational Control and 
Resistance in Crowd-Based Platforms 
 
David A. Askay 
California Polytechnic State University 
daskay@calpoly.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a research agenda for crowd 
behavior research by drawing from the 
organizational control literature. It addresses the 
need for research into the organizational and social 
structures that guide user behavior and contributions 
in crowd-based platforms. Crowd behavior is 
situated within a conceptual framework of 
organizational control. This framework helps 
scholars more fully articulate the full range of 
control mechanisms operating in crowd-based 
platforms, contextualizes these mechanisms into the 
context of crowd-based platforms, challenges existing 
rational assumptions about incentive systems, and 
clarifies theoretical constructs of organizational 
control to foster stronger integration between 
information systems research and organizational and 
management science. 
  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Organizations are increasingly interested in 
harnessing the collective actions of crowds to meet 
business goals [1]. This has resulted in the 
proliferation of crowd-based platforms supporting 
collective intelligence and crowdsourcing efforts that 
coordinate the contribution of user-generated 
content—product reviews, encyclopedia articles, and 
current traffic conditions. Consequently, the crowd 
has become a powerful source of knowledge that 
guides not only the decisions of the public, but also 
decisions made by organizations [2]. As 
organizations like Amazon, Waze, and Wikipedia 
turn to the crowd to produce the content that their 
business models depend on, the challenge of how to 
motivate and govern the crowd has become the topic 
of much research [1, 3]. While there is scholarly 
interest in the “actions and policies employed to 
effectively manage the crowd and steer them” [4], 
there remains limited research about effective 
mechanisms for governing the crowd [5].  
Crowd-based platforms coordinate action through 
decomposing tasks and encouraging individuals to 
participate by providing intrinsic (e.g., fun, 
enjoyment) and/or extrinsic (e.g., status, money, 
social interaction, etc.) motivators [3]. Three recent 
Information Systems (IS) reviews of crowdsourcing 
research [6, 4, 7] emphasize the importance of 
designing effective incentive systems. However, 
research on motivation is somewhat disparate, with 
various categorizations and often inconsistent 
findings as to which incentives are the most effective 
[4]. Moreover, this approach can be limited by its 
often deterministic and rational assumptions of user 
behavior and motivation, which overlooks normative 
and social aspects of human behavior [8]. To more 
fully understand the dynamics of crowd behavior and 
governance of crowd-based projects, IS researchers 
need a sophisticated way to conceptualize the 
complex social and organizational processes that 
guide the behavior and actions of the crowd. 
To fill this conceptual gap in the crowd behavior 
literature, this paper draws from organizational 
control research. Organizational control refers to the 
strategies used by managers to align worker 
behaviors to organizational objectives [9, 10]. While 
IS scholars have occasionally focused on 
organizational control mechanisms [11, 12, 13], an 
explicit consideration of control mechanisms is 
particularly limited in the crowdsourcing and 
collective intelligence literature. 
This paper makes four contributions to the 
literature. First, I present a framework that more fully 
articulates the range of control mechanisms that 
guide the behavior of the crowd. Second, I 
contextualize this framework through providing 
examples of organizational control research in 
crowd-based platforms. Third, I identify promising  
new directions for crowd behavior research by 
bringing in the ontologically and methodologically 
diverse organizational control literature [14]. Fourth, 
this paper clarifies theoretical constructs of 
organizational control in order to foster integrative 
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research drawing from both IS and organizational 
science literature.  
 
2. Organizational Control and Crowds 
 
This section defines organizational control, 
summarizes an input-process-output model of 
organizational control, and describes resistance to 
organizational control. 
  
2.1. What is Organizational Control? 
  
While IS researchers often note the ‘loss of 
control’ associated with crowdsourcing [5], control is 
a fundamental aspect of all organizations and is 
needed to coordinate goal-oriented behaviors [15]. As 
will be described below, crowd-based platforms use a 
diverse range of control mechanisms. Organizational 
control includes the mechanisms used by managers to 
direct, motivate, and encourage worker behaviors to 
align with organizational objectives [9, 10]. The need 
for organizational control stems from the competing 
interests that exist between individuals and 
organizations, which can be resolved though control 
mechanisms (e.g., rules, rewards, punishments, 
supervision, etc.) that subordinate the individual’s 
goals to those of the organization. Control strategies 
include the incentives that motivate some behaviors 
(e.g., incentive systems) and also the mechanisms 
that constrain other behaviors.   
Various control mechanisms are used by 
organizations, including policies [16], bureaucratic 
rules [17], culture [18], incentive systems and 
supervision [19], identity [20], and technological 
design [9]. Scholars have offered several approaches 
to categorizing these control strategies [9, 10, 21, 22], 
though most distinguish between formal and informal 
control strategies [22, 11]. 
Formal control strategies (also called rational 
control) seek to influence behavior through the 
explicit and codified structuring of inputs, tasks, 
processes, behaviors, and/or outcomes—in essence 
providing incentives in return for completing well-
designed tasks within certain parameters or punishing 
those that deviate from this organizationally designed 
process. This forms the basis for the incentives 
systems currently used by many crowd-based 
platforms. Additionally, behavior can be directed 
through bureaucratic rules, direct supervision, and 
technological design. These control strategies are 
premised on the assumptions that individuals are 
primarily rational and view work as an economic 
exchange, and that there is a generally linear cause-
and-effect relationship between incentives and action 
[22].  
By contrast, informal control strategies (also 
called normative or social control) seek to guide 
behaviors through fostering collective norms, 
identity, culture, and values in members. A 
theoretically and ontologically diverse range of 
scholars have considered these kinds of informal 
control strategies [23, 21, 20, 9, 24, 14, 25]. In 
general, socio-ideological control occurs when 
individuals are socialized into an organization’s 
system of beliefs, values, and norms (i.e., corporate 
culture), which provides a particular organizational 
reality that acts as a sense-making device for member 
behaviors. When these values and norms are 
internalized, members can monitor their own 
behaviors to ensure that they align with 
organizational goals. Informal control mechanisms 
are particularly useful for knowledge work, where 
required creativity, ambiguity, and flexibility are not 
conducive to bureaucratic control strategies that 
dictate a rule for every contingency [26]. Still, 
control strategies often do not fit firmly in one of 
these two categories, and a single mechanism may 
possess attributes of both formal and informal 
strategies [10, 21].  
 
2.2. Framework of Organizational Control 
 
A recent synthesis of organizational control 
research uses an input, process, output (IPO) model 
to produce a useful model for conceptualizing the 
various mechanisms in a control system [10]. This 
framework classifies control systems on the degree to 
which formal and informal control mechanisms target 
the input, behavior, and output of the system. It 
presents a control system as comprised of several 
control mechanisms (e.g., bureaucratic, 
technological, direct, socio-ideological, etc.) that 
each have a control target (e.g., input, behavior, 
output) in the organization. Input targets include 
mechanisms that control how inputs (e.g., who is 
allowed to participate) to the system are qualified, 
chosen, and prepared, such as through the selection, 
training, and socialization of individuals. Behavior 
targets focus on controlling the manner in which 
individuals perform actions or complete tasks. 
Finally, output targets include mechanisms that 
control qualitative and quantitative outcomes, such as 
profits, quality standards, production volume, and 
speed. This framework draws attention to the various 
control mechanisms that collectively comprise a 
control system. 
Most IS research on crowd behavior has focused 
on the study of formal control mechanisms (i.e., 
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incentive systems) that target the outputs produced by 
the crowd [4]. By contrast, little scholarly attention 
has been directed towards control mechanisms that 
target inputs (e.g., who is included and excluded from 
participating, socialization and training, etc.) and 
behaviors (e.g., how and when contributions are 
produced). Additionally, informal control 
mechanisms have been understudied in the context of 
crowd behavior, if mentioned at all. Finally, little 
research has addressed how several control strategies 
may work in tandem to control crowd behavior, an 
approach that is advocated for by organizational 
scholars [21, 26, 27]. 
 
2.3. Resistance to Organizational Control 
 
Control is often implicitly considered a 
straightforward—even deterministic—process by 
scholars, whereby the application of proper control 
mechanisms produce desired user behavior. This is 
reflected in IS studies suggesting that “task designers 
must guess at the right combination of incentives and 
iterate until success” [3] or simply identify the “right 
incentive mechanism” [4] for encouraging 
participation. However, other scholars challenge this 
rational deterministic view of control by questioning 
the assumption that “control is achieved by designing 
and applying appropriate structures, procedures, 
measures and targets; and, relatedly, that resistance to 
these mechanisms is symptomatic of `poor design’ or 
`poor management’ that can be rectified by 
restructuring” [20].  
Critical approaches to organizational control, by 
contrast, view organizations as socially constructed 
and as sites of power and resistance [14], where 
divergent interests among stakeholders often 
provokes subversion, protest, sabotage, and other 
deviant behaviors [28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Indeed, 
conflict and struggle may be as commonplace in 
crowds as compliance and consent. Yet resistance as 
core aspect of organizational life is overlooked in 
crowd behavior research, where participation is often 
conceived of as binary—individuals participate or 
they do not. By focusing scholarly attention to the 
struggles experienced by various stakeholders, we 
can better understand the full range of stakeholder 
experiences in these platforms and design more 
humane and democratic platforms.  
A recent example underscores the less visible 
actions of control and resistance that occur in crowd-
based platforms. Waze is a GPS-based navigation 
application for smartphones that incorporates real-
time user-reported accidents, traffic, and police cars 
to optimize routes. When a detour consistently 
rerouted traffic through a previously quiet 
neighborhood, local residents began posting false 
reports during rush hour in effort to redirect traffic 
away [33]. However, these acts of resistance were 
suppressed through two organizational control 
mechanisms. First, other Waze users were able to 
invalidate the false reports through submitting their 
own report. Second, an algorithm used data 
transmitted by the smartphone (e.g., speed, direction, 
etc.) to suspend the user accounts of those suspected 
of submitting false reports. Together, these control 
mechanisms were sufficient to overcome the 
resistance efforts of these stakeholders and 
marginalize their interests. Given the scale at which 
crowd-based platforms operate, the question of how 
control systems produce winners and losers as 
stakeholders struggle over divergent goals becomes 
an important area of study. 
 
3. Organizational Control Mechanisms 
 
A summary of formal and informal control 
mechanisms is presented. Examples of crowd-based 
platforms are provided, drawing from studies that 
explicitly or implicitly embody these control 
mechanisms. This reveals a variety of yet 
unconsidered control mechanisms currently used in 
crowd-based platforms. 
 
3.1. Bureaucratic Control 
 
Bureaucratic control relies on impersonal and 
formal system of rules, procedures, and roles to guide 
worker behavior [17], although some rules may also 
be informal. Such systems can, for example, dictate 
the kinds of people selected for a task, the manner by 
which tasks are supposed to be completed, the kinds 
of behaviors that are acceptable, and how 
performance is evaluated, rewarded, and punished. 
Often organizational control is achieved by explicitly 
linking worker behaviors to sanctions or rewards, 
targeting extrinsic and intrinsic motivators of these 
individuals [34]. Extrinsic motivation induces 
cooperation through the promise of instrumental 
benefits, such as money, status, or reputation. 
Conversely, intrinsic motivation results from 
individuals cooperating due to the task being 
personally rewarding, such as enjoyment, fun, and 
altruism.  
The use of bureaucratic control is identifiable in 
many crowd-based platforms, as rule-based 
contributions are used to coordinate the collective 
action of unconnected individuals. Other rules may 
motivate participation by providing clear guidelines 
or criteria for achieving certain symbols of status 
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(e.g., badges or titles) or earning rewards (e.g., 
money). Alternatively, individuals may participate 
more when they know that their contributions are 
quantified and made visible on their profile. A recent 
literature review concluded that studies of incentive 
systems and motivation are among the most studied 
aspects of crowd behavior in the IS literature [4]. Yet, 
these findings are often inconsistent, with it 
remaining unclear which, if any, of these intrinsic 
and extrinsic incentives are the most important for 
recruiting and fostering participation. 
Two important observations about crowd 
behavior research arise from these findings. First, 
extant IS research focuses heavily on incentives that 
target outputs where participants are rewarded for 
their contributions with status, recognition, badges, or 
money. Less often examined are formal rules that 
target inputs (e.g., who gets to participate) or 
behaviors (e.g., how people perform tasks) in the 
system. Second, most research examines rules that 
motivate certain actions, while overlooking formal 
rules act to constrain other actions. As organizations 
seek to adequately govern and control the crowd, 
more research is needed to understand the extent to 
which formal rules reward and punish, not just 
outputs, but also inputs and behaviors. 
 
3.1.1. Example of Bureaucratic Control. A 
study of reviewers on Yelp reveals how bureaucratic 
rules, in the form of the terms of service, impacts 
crowd behavior. While Yelp promotes empowerment 
and transparency through its online review system, 
the terms of service disallow users from including 
civic or political discourses in their reviews [35]. 
Kuehn describes how some participants on Yelp 
“monitored and flagged political reviews that did not 
fit Yelp’s terms of service” [36], which limited the 
discursive agency available to users in their 
evaluations on Yelp. This bureaucratic rule, enforced 
through self-policing, suppressed and filtered reviews 
deemed inappropriate by Yelp. These rules construct 
Yelp as ‘‘not the place’’ for consumer politics despite 
promoting itself as a platform for empowerment and 
transparency. More importantly, users are 
empowered to produce only the type of content that 
aligns the objectives of the greater organization—the 
crowd is not simply encouraged to contribute, but to 
contribute the ‘right’ kind of content.  
This study reveals an important, yet understudied, 
way in which formal rules are used to constrain the 
kind of content that is produced in a crowd-based 
platform. Perhaps most interesting is that some users 
chose to self-police the reviews to ensure that these 
rules were being followed by others. This reveals that 
not only did these members know about these rules, 
but that they were also sufficiently internalized to the 
point that they would self-police content despite no 
clear incentive. A deeply unsatisfying explanation of 
this behavior is that some members just happen to 
take on extra tasks for no apparent reason. These 
members are likely driven by commitment to the 
organization and its goals through socio-ideological 
control (described below) or perhaps the kind of 
concertive control found in self-managed teams [24]. 
Here, the alignment of two different control 
mechanisms work together to produce a control 
system that discourages and eliminates certain kinds 
of contributions to Yelp. However, this may also be a 
cautionary lesson as organizational research reveals 
that rules deemed ‘bad’ by members can also become 
dysfunctional [37, 38, 39], leading individuals to 
resist, engage in mischief, or leave the organization. 
In other words, some formal rules may act as a 
disincentive for participation.  
 
3.2. Technological Control 
 
Technological control is exercised through 
organizational technologies that substitute for the 
presence of direct supervision and constrains the 
amount of discretion available to workers [40]. For 
example, assembly lines can control the pace of work 
in factories, while soda fountains at McDonald’s 
dispense precisely the right amount of soda into cups 
to eliminate waste [30]. Such mechanisms severely 
limit the ability of workers to deviate from the 
organizationally planned process, highlighting their 
use in targeting the behavior of participants—
constraining how and when they work. Other 
technologies can provide the constant threat of 
surveillance, acting as an invisible supervisor that can 
notify managers or take action when a worker 
deviates from a task.  
There are several ways in which technological 
control can be exerted in crowd-based platforms. 
Contractors on the digital labor market Upwork, for 
example, can be surveilled by their employers 
through recording their desktop screens while they 
work. More recently, the use of algorithms has also 
explored as a means of control [41, 42]. For example, 
the Yelp filter automatically removes roughly 20% of 
reviews submitted to the website that are suspicious 
[43]. While this is done to remove fake or paid-for 
reviews, it also may upset individuals that provided 
honest opinions only to find them removed for an 
unknown reason.   
Technological control can also be linked to the 
concept of affordances, which has been increasingly 
used in the IS field [44, 45]. Affordances of a 
technological artifact are the potentials for action 
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perceived by an individual [45], which can be 
mediated by group norms [46]. As a result, 
affordances of technology are not viewed 
deterministic, but rather accept that technologies can 
be adopted in unintended ways by users. This has 
been applied to crowdsourcing by IS researchers who 
recognize that “design elements of a variety of 
architectures that constrain and afford purposeful 
human actions” [47]. In this sense, the affordances 
designed into crowdsourcing platforms might act to 
shape crowd behavior. Still, while affordances are 
often conceived of as enabling and constraining 
action, the explicit study of affordances (or lack 
thereof) being strategically designed (or omitted) 
from crowd platforms to further organizational goals 
emerges as understudied. 
  
3.2.1. Example of Technological Control. One 
study investigating a peer feedback system on a 
popular hospitality exchange website provides 
insights to how technological control through 
affordances may function in crowd-based platforms 
[48]. This study found that the contribution of 
negative feedback was inhibited by the affordances of 
the system. Specifically, users of this website 
reported that their negative experiences could not be 
adequately explained within the 1,000 character limit 
available for references and that the required labeling 
of feedback as negative, neutral, or positive did not 
align with their subjective experience. As a result, 
many users did not feel empowered to contribute 
their negative experiences. This contributed to the 
overall positive bias of feedback on the system and 
may have (intentionally or unintentionally) benefited 
the organization because new members (and hence 
income) were recruited through its advertised high 
level of positive feedback. Interestingly, though, 
these users resisted this technological control by 
instead expressing negative experiences in the 
discussion forums—a channel with different 
technological affordances that did not restrict the 
length of comments nor require labels. This shows 
that users were willing to contribute the content of 
their negative experiences, but that the technological 
affordances of this platform restricted the kinds of 
feedback that users were able to produce.   
 
3.3. Direct Control 
 
Direct control is generally enacted through a 
formalized hierarchical supervisor-subordinate 
relationship in which the supervisor has the 
legitimate authority to instruct workers on what to do, 
monitor their behavior, and reward and punish them 
as needed. This definition suggests that it is unlikely 
that direct supervision exists in crowdsourcing. 
Indeed, scholars assert that crowdsourcing “implies 
voluntary participation of individuals, with no 
hierarchy or contract related  constraint … 
[c]oordination by hierarchy does not take place” [49]. 
Other conceptualizations of crowdsourcing and 
collective intelligence emphasize that lack of 
hierarchy is a condition of crowdsourcing [1] and that 
crowds lack direct supervision [3].  
 
3.3.1. Example of Direct Control. Emerging 
research, however, challenges the assumed lack of 
direct supervision of the crowd. Several studies have 
identified people holding the position of a community 
manager operating in crowd-based platforms. In one 
study, the community manager was found to play an 
integral role in managing the production of user-
generated content. As Kerr and Kelleher explain, 
“[w]hen share value depends on market share, unique 
users, and clicks, companies are turning to a range of 
techniques to “engage,” retain, and convert user 
activity into revenue [including] the employment of 
community managers” [50]. These community 
managers were found to organize offline events, 
manage problematic user behaviors, and deal with the 
emotions of users. Other scholars found that 
community managers monitor and control crowd 
activity and “promote the participation and 
collaboration of stakeholders in order to improve 
some ‘crowdsourcing’ processes” [51]. Still, 
relatively little is known about these community 
managers and the extent to which they are effective. 
They reveal, however, that as harnessing crowds has 
become more central to organizations, more formal 
and rational forms of direct control appear to be 
implemented to guide crowd behaviors. It also 
illustrates the importance considering how 
unexpected forms of control may operate in crowd-
based platforms. 
  
3.4. Socio-Ideological Control 
 
While previous control mechanisms are founded 
on a rational approach to human behavior, socio-
ideological control mechanisms stem from a 
normative approach to control, in which the 
organization can foster the development of beliefs 
and values that workers are expected to internalize 
and use as a guide for their behaviors [21]. Scholars 
have noted a lack of conceptual consensus of 
informal approaches  [10], contributing to 
development of several overlapping theories of socio-
ideological control, including corporate culture, 
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cultural control [52, 53], clan mechanisms [9], 
disciplinary control [54, 55], and identity-based 
control [20, 23]. These theories are likewise 
differentiated by their intellectual traditions and 
ontological and epistemological orientations, 
including structural functionalism, post-structuralism, 
social constructivist, post-modernism, critical theory, 
positivism, and interpretism. 
Informal control mechanisms generally involve “a 
process of reality construction that allows people to 
see and understand particular events, actions, objects, 
utterances, or situations in distinctive ways” [56]. 
Through discourse that shapes the organizational 
reality of members, organizations can influence 
behavior by guiding worker values, beliefs, norms, 
taken-for-granted assumptions, concepts of right and 
wrong, and good and bad. Ultimately, this serves to 
eliminate or minimize the incongruence that exists 
between individual and organizational goals.  
Socio-ideological control mechanisms are less 
obtrusive than rational control systems as they do not 
rely on external structures of the organizations 
(supervisors, technology, or rules). Rather, through a 
strong culture or identity fostered through 
organizational discourses, workers are encouraged to 
monitor their own behavior to ensure that they make 
decisions and actions that align with organizational 
goals. This places emphasis on understanding how 
language and organizational discourse (e.g., written 
documents, speech, pictures, symbols, etc.) is drawn 
upon by members to constitute their social reality and 
organizational life [57]. Discourse can be thought of 
as “a way of reasoning…anchored in a particular 
vocabulary that constitutes a particular version of the 
social world” [58], based in the assertion that 
“language constructs organizational reality, rather 
than simply reflects it” [59]. This emphasizes the 
analysis of verbal and written communication 
including organization stories [60, 61], rituals [62, 
63], narratives [64], and metaphors [65] used by the 
organization and shared among members and used as 
a sense-making device [66]. Several recent studies 
offer detailed accounts of socio-ideological control in 
organizational contexts [67, 68, 69, 21]. 
One example of discourse constructing a certain 
organizational reality can be found in the concept of 
playbour (a play on the words play and labour) [70]. 
This occurs when organizations encourage 
participants to understand their unpaid contributions 
(such as unpaid video game modding) as ‘fun’ or a 
‘hobby’, while the organization extracts value from 
their efforts. Their labor is paradoxically “voluntarily 
given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited” [71].  
This framing obscures other constructions of their 
participation—such as volunteering, work, or 
donating and suppresses the idea that they might be 
deserving of payment.  
Despite the popularity of investigating socio-
ideological control mechanisms in the organizational 
and managerial sciences, this is understudied in 
studies of crowd behavior. Yet, IS scholars have 
called for research to investigate the social processes 
operating in crowd-based projects [8]. Moreover, 
research demonstrating frequent communication 
among crowd workers [72] and the employment of 
community managers [51] suggests that 
crowdsourcing platforms may be more social and 
have greater organizational contact than sometimes 
believed.  
 
3.4.1. Example of Socio-Ideological Control. The 
findings of a recent ethnography of the invite-only 
Yelp Elite Squad implicitly speaks to how socio-
ideological control functions in a crowd-based 
platform [73]. The Yelp Elite Squad exists in cities 
around the world, members of which spend 
significant time visiting business, producing reviews, 
and participating in online forum discussions. In 
return, they are invited to free offline member-only 
events each month. They are incidentally coordinated 
by a community manager (CM), who is a trained and 
paid employee of Yelp. The study describes how 
discursive resources on the Yelp website and 
communication by the community manager foster a 
specific organizational reality. Elite Squad members 
are constructed as community members through 
discourse defining them as “the true heart of the Yelp 
community” and “a local authority and role model for 
the Yelp community” that has “got a lot of sway in 
the community” [74]. Coinciding with this, members 
reported that they strive to be Yelpy and Yelp-like, 
which includes behaviors like representing Yelp well 
to businesses, not demanding special treatment, 
recruiting new members, producing high quality 
reviews, and producing reviews often. Furthermore, 
the construction of their participation as community 
members was sufficiently powerful that when asked 
about their role in Yelp’s business, members 
responded saying that they simply had not considered 
Yelp as a business or their labor as producing 
financial value. One member said that, “I just feel 
like, oh it’s just a fun community and you know, get 
free dinners and it’s just like friends are in it . . . I see 
Yelp as a community more than I do a business. Like, 
I never really thought of it being a business” [73]. 
Several implications arise from considering the 
Elite Squad from the perspective of socio-ideological 
control. First, the desire to be ‘Yelpy’ suggests that 
these individuals strongly identity with the 
organization and have internalized a set of values and 
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beliefs that guide their behavior, which leads to them 
to self-monitor their actions even when they are not 
supervised (e.g., not demanding special treatment). 
How Yelp was able to achieve this becomes an 
interesting scholarly question. Second, these 
members internalized Yelp’s version of 
organizational reality, in which their participation is 
understood through a civic-minded framing of 
‘community’, rather than as a volunteer or as rational 
exchange with a for-profit business that financially 
benefits from their unpaid labor. The discursive 
resources that constitute the Elite Squad as a 
community obscure how their labor financially 
benefits Yelp—it was not until confronted with this 
idea by the interviewer that members were able to 
make sense of their participation differently. This 
suggests that hegemony—a process of gaining the 
active consent of a dominated group [75, 76]—and 
related considerations of asymmetrical power 
differences is a fruitful area of consideration for 
further research. Third, it highlights that some crowd-
based platforms require individuals to operate in 
offline settings (e.g., visiting businesses to review) 
where they are not as easily survailled by the 
organization. Yet, the organization still has an 
interest in controlling the behavior of participants in 
these offline spaces. Here, disciplinary control, in 
which members self-monitor their behavior [55, 54, 
23], emerges a powerful mechanism of organizational 
control. Fourth, it demonstrates that not all 
individuals in the crowd are subject to the same 
control mechanisms. Rather, there appears to be be 
less visible sub-groups [77] operating in the crowd 
subject to different mechanisms of organizational 
control. Overall, this study brings attention to the 
importance of considering discourse in the 
investigation of informal control strategies in crowd-
based platforms.   
 
4. A Research Agenda for Crowd Behavior 
Based on Organizational Control Theory 
 
There is an assumption that crowd-based 
platforms imply the loss of control by organizations 
[2, 5]. However, by clarifying mechanisms of 
organizational control and situating these within 
empirical studies of crowd-based platforms, this 
paper demonstrates that a diverse array of formal and 
informal organizational control mechanisms do 
indeed operate in this setting. Organizational control 
scholars note that researchers are often too singular in 
their conceptualizations and empirical focus when 
studying control mechanisms, frequently choosing to 
examine one type of control over others [10]. While 
the IS literature has revealed much about incentive 
systems [4] that target outputs, other types of formal 
and informal control mechanisms have been 
understudied. Yet these are critical aspects to 
investigate as scholars and designers seek to 
understand the best ways to govern the crowd. 
To address this need, this paper encourages IS 
scholars to consider the various formal and informal 
control mechanisms operating at the input, behavior, 
and output targets of crowd-based platforms [10]. 
Through applying these concepts to studies of various 
crowd-based platforms, some key insights emerge.  
While bureaucratic incentives systems that 
encourage certain outputs emerged as the most 
commonly studied type of control, far less examined 
are the rules and policies that act to constrain crowd 
behavior. Moreover, the study of self-policing at 
Yelp [36] suggests that some control mechanisms 
work in concert with each other (i.e., bureaucratic 
and socio-ideological) to encourage some users to 
flag content that deviates from what Yelp considers 
appropriate. Effectively, a control system was 
devised that encourages some users to flag and 
remove content that deviates from organizationally 
appropriate standards. This type of crowd behavior is 
both incredibly interesting and understudied. Future 
research may draw from concertive control literature 
[24] and studies that examine the interplay of several 
control mechanisms [21, 26] to further examine 
similar phenomena. 
In regard to technological control, a study of the 
feedback system on a hospitality website revealed 
that the design and absence of some affordances 
acted to inhibit the contribution of negative reviews 
[48]. This suggests that a promising vein of crowd 
behavior research could more explicitly integrate the 
technological affordances and materiality literature 
[44, 46] in studies of organizational control.  
Similarly, the use of algorithms to automate control is 
likewise an emerging area of relevance to the 
functioning of crowd-based platforms [41, 42].  
Emerging research on community managers 
suggests that some crowd-based platforms are using 
direct control of crowd members through local paid 
employees, who monitor and manage members of the 
crowd [73, 50, 51]. Further research is needed to 
clarity the role of these community managers and 
how the crowd responds to and resists being managed 
and managing each other. Still, this brings to focus 
the need to better understand how control systems 
evolve over time [10] on crowd-based platforms.  
Informal control mechanisms emerged as 
important and understudied in crowd-based 
platforms. A study of the Elite Squad reveals strong 
commitment and identification to Yelp [73]. 
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Moreover, how these members made sense of their 
organizational reality was shown to be influenced 
strongly by organizational discourse and discursive 
resources. Just as an incentive system can encourage 
certain behaviors through motivation, organizational 
discourse can encourage certain behaviors through 
constructing organizational realities and identities of 
crowd members. Future research could adopt 
discourse analysis [64, 57] to investigate how 
organizational language constructs certain meanings 
for participants and influences overall crowd 
behavior.  
Finally, this review of the literature reveals that 
the power struggles inherent in organizational life 
that manifest in resistance, hegemony, and 
domination [29, 30, 14, 75] have largely been 
unexamined in the crowd behavior literature. Yet, 
examples presented in this paper illustrate the 
struggles emerge over defining what kind of content 
is appropriate [36, 35] or resisting the material 
impacts of crowdsourcing technologies [33]. 
Research adopting a critical perspective [14] to 
organizational control in crowd-based platforms 
could provide valuable insights into these issues. 
Limitations are present in this review. While an 
effort was made to draw from literature investigating 
a variety of crowd-based platforms (e.g., Amazon, 
Reddit, etc.), research on Yelp is over-represented. 
This is because studies that explicitly or implicitly 
addressed issues relating to organizational control 
were scarce in other platforms. Rather, studies of 
these platforms would often examine large datasets of 
what is produced by the crowd (e.g., reviews.). Far 
fewer studies have investigated how this content is 
produced by the crowd (e.g., interviews, 
ethnography, etc.). The scarcity of these kinds of 
studies underscores the need for further research 
analyzing the important social and organizational 
processes influencing crowd behavior. Ultimately, 
this review leads to a range of interesting research 
questions: 
 
• What is the full array of control mechanisms 
used in crowd-based platforms and how do they 
influence participation? How do control 
mechanisms enable and constrain the content 
produced by the crowd? How do various control 
mechanisms reinforce or contradict each other 
and how are these resolved? How do control 
mechanisms evolve over time and how does the 
crowd respond to changes?  
 
• Who are the stakeholders in crowd-based 
platforms and what are their goals? What 
tensions arise from divergent stakeholder goals 
and how are they resolved? What is the ‘right’ 
kind of content produced by the crowd and who 
defines this? To what extent can control be 
resisted? How do control mechanisms produce 
winners and losers?  
 
• What are the similarities and differences between 
control systems in traditional organizations and 
crowd-based platforms?  
 
• What emergent or organizationally constructed 
socio-ideological norms guide crowd behavior? 
How are identities of crowd members socially 
constructed through organizational discourses?  
 
In conclusion, many studies of crowd behavior 
focus on a limited range of incentive systems. Less 
frequent are investigations of the organizational and 
social aspects that influence how and what content is 
produced. This review presents the ontologically, 
theoretically, and methodological diverse literature of 
organizational control as a promising framework for 
investigating these aspects of crowd behavior. This 
review also encourages a more careful consideration 
of the term crowd and its popularization as an 
alternative to organizations. While crowd highlights 
many of the novel and different aspects of crowd-
based platforms, it may also act to obscure from 
scholars the more traditional organizational structures 
that operate in crowd-based platforms. Scholars can 
build a more complete understanding of the complex 
sociotechnical processes influencing crowd behavior 
by remaining open to discovering unexpected control 
mechanisms operating in this context. While much 
can be learned about crowds by examining how they 
are different from organizations, there is also value in 
examining how they are similar.  
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